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Sometime in the early evening, a police officer pulls over a Chevrolet sedan for failing to 
properly signal a right-hand turn.  Before approaching the vehicle, the officer checks the warrant 
database on his cruiser’s computer and finds that the owner of the sedan has an outstanding arrest 
warrant.  The officer approaches the car, identifies that the driver is the owner of the sedan, and 
places her under arrest.  The officer then performs a brief pat-down and pocket search of the 
arrestee, finding nothing illicit.  After locking the driver in the back of his patrol car, the officer 
searches the Chevy sedan and finds a small amount of cocaine under the seat.  At a pretrial 
motion hearing, the driver tries to suppress the cocaine recovered from her car as obtained in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. 
The preceding story is a common one for the almost 40,000 people arrested in this 
country every day,1 and has been for many decades.  Whether the evidence will be suppressed, 
however, cannot be determined from the facts given.  If the year were 1972, the search would 
almost certainly be held unconstitutional.  In 1982, the answer is not so clear.  In 1992 and 2002, 
the search would almost certainly be allowed. But now in 2012, the answer again is unclear.  
Whether the search is permissible now depends on factors such as where the arrest was made; the 
time of day; the allegations in the outstanding warrant; the make of the car being a Chevrolet 
(and not a Ford); whether the Chevy was an economy, mid-sized, or full-sized sedan; whether 
the driver left her cell phone visible in the car; and the officer’s experience in handling similar 
stops.    
This paper examines the current state of the “search incident to lawful arrest” (“SILA”) 
exception to the warrant requirement three years after the Supreme Court’s holding in Arizona v. 
                                                




Gant.2  Specifically, it focuses on the divided interpretations of Justice Scalia’s evidence-
gathering addition to the Court’s holding in that case.  The article starts with a brief summary of 
the origins of the exception, tracking the iterations through the exception’s formative period.3  It 
then focuses on how the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the topic, Arizona v. Gant, 
changed interpretations and applications of the exception since April 2009.4  After contrasting 
the various interpretations of the second prong of the Gant holding, which I have termed Scalia’s 
rule, I will advocate the most proper interpretation of the Gant opinion language for lower courts 
going forward.5   
I. HISTORY OF THE SILA DOCTRINE 
The SILA exception to the warrant requirement is an ancient doctrine, long recognized at 
common law.6 In its most primitive form, the SILA exception allowed an arresting police officer 
to search an arrestee for weapons that could be used against the officer or evidence that the 
suspect may destroy or conceal.7 The rationale behind the exception, eloquently explained by 
Justice Cardozo, can be simply put: “[t]he peace officer empowered to arrest must be empowered 
to disarm. If he may disarm, he may search, lest a weapon be concealed. The search being 
lawful, he retains what he finds if connected with the crime.”8  Grown from its early English and 
American roots, the SILA doctrine has expanded to encompass many new factual scenarios 
beyond a mere search of the person arrested.  
Throughout its history, the SILA exception has been supported on two distinct, competing 
rationales: the exigency rationale and the evidence-gathering rationale.  The Court has 
                                                
2 556 U.S. 332 (2009).   
3 See History infra Part I.   
4 See Discussion infra Part II.   
5 See Analysis infra Part IV. 
6 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
7 Id.  
8 People v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 197 (1923). 
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historically switched between those rationales, unable settle the logic behind the exception.9  The 
first, the exigency rationale, rests on an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment which requires 
state actors to get a warrant whenever practicable, that is when exigent circumstances are not 
prohibitive.10  The evidence-gathering rationale reads the Fourth Amendment to only prohibit 
unreasonable searches; applying courts conclude that warrantless searches can be reasonable if 
limited in scope and duration.11 
The current rule in the automobile context has become a hybrid of sorts:  contemporaneous to 
a lawful arrest of an automobile occupant, a government actor may search the arrested person 
and the area within reaching distance of the arrested person if it is reasonably likely that the 
arrestee may gain access to the place to be searched to procure a weapon or destroy evidence 
(exigency rationale) or if it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime for which the 
arrestee was arrested may be found therein (evidence-gathering rationale).  The evolution of the 
modern exception is covered in the paragraphs that follow.  
A. The Beginnings of the SILA Doctrine 
 In American jurisprudence, the SILA exception first received the Court’s recognition in the 
1914 opinion in Weeks v. United States.12 In that case, the Court recognized in passing dicta that 
the right to search the person of an arrestee when legally arrested has been long recognized under 
both English and American Law.13   
 Eleven years later in Carroll v. United States, the Court noted “whatever is found upon 
[the arrestee’s] person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be 
                                                
9 See History infra Part I.A- B. 
10 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.752, 761 (1969). 
11 See, e.g.,United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950).   
12 232 U.S. 383.   
13 Id. at 392.   
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used to prove the offense may be seized.”14  Just weeks later in the in the Agnello v. United 
States opinion, the Court stated in dicta that the government’s right to search persons lawfully 
arrested and “to search the place where the arrest is made to find and seize things connected 
with the crime as its fruits . . . is not to be doubted.” 15 Though this language did not form part of 
the Court’s holding, it still represented another significant expansion of the language in Weeks 
and Carroll.   
 The SILA doctrine, which had so far been mentioned only in dicta, took center stage as 
the basis for the Court’s opinion two years later in Marron v. United States.16 In that case, 
prohibition officers obtained a search warrant allowing the search and seizure of liquors and 
certain articles used in the alcohol manufacturing process.17  During the search, the officers 
discovered and seized a ledger, an item not covered by the warrant.18  The Court upheld the 
seizure, concluding the officers had a right to contemporaneously search the location and seize 
items used to carry out the enterprise incident to the lawful arrest of the suspects.19  While the 
Court in Carroll hinted at reliance on the exigency rationale,20 Marron focused on the police’s 
interest in gathering evidence.21 
 Just three years after Marron, the Court swapped rationales in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. 
United States22 and United States v. Lefkowitz.23 In Go-Bart, agents “ransacked” the defendants’ 
                                                
14 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (expanding the scope from just the person to the things within his “control.”) (emphasis 
added). 
15 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (expanding the Carroll statements) (emphasis added). 
16 275 U.S. 192 (1927).   
17 Id. at 194. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 267 U.S. at 153 (recognizing a “difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in 
respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or 
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly 
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.”). 
21 See 275 U.S. at 199. 
22 282 U.S. 344 (1930). 
23 285 U.S. 452 (1932).   
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office, showing both false arrest and search warrants, and seized papers from the office, the desk, 
and the safe.24  Because the agents effectuated an arrest and searched the premises pursuant to 
invalid warrants and in bad faith, the Court declined to extend SILA to permit a search in that 
situation.25 The Go-Bart opinion was supported by the exigency rationale.26 
 In Lefkowitz, prohibition agents served an arrest warrant at an office where the occupants 
were suspected of conspiracy to distribute spirits.27 When effectuating the search, the agents 
opened all the desk drawers and cabinets and took books, papers, and the contents of the waste 
bins, which they later pieced together to repair the documents.28 The Court distinguished 
Marron: the Marron search involved officers who witnessed ongoing criminal activity (the 
search was of a distillery fully equipped with bar and bartender) and the ledger was part of the 
“outfit” used to commit the offense.29 The search in Lefkowitz was exploratory in nature and 
unsupported by the warrant.30      
 The factual high-water mark for the evidence-gathering rationale came twelve years later 
in Harris v. United States.31  In that case, FBI agents served an arrest warrant on the defendant in 
his apartment and agents performed an exploratory search.32 The warrantless search lasted over 
five hours before the agents found an envelope labeled “personal papers.”33 The contents, 
selective service draft cards, supported the defendant’s ultimate conviction.34  The Court noted 
that a search incident to lawful arrest is not necessarily restricted to the room in which the 
                                                
24 282 U.S. at 358. 
25 See Id. 
26 Id. (noting the agents’ failure to obtain a warrant despite having the opportunity). 
27 285 U.S. at 458.  
28 Id. at 458-59. 
29 Id. at 465.   
30 Id. 
31 331 U.S. 145 (1947). 
32 See Id.  at 148-49. 
33 Id. at 149. 
34 Id.  (convicted for alteration of draft cards). 
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suspect was arrested.35 The Harris Court upheld the search, concluding it was not “too intensive” 
in light of the elusive nature of the stolen checks, the lawful entry via the arrest warrants, and the 
inherently illegal nature of the items seized.36 37   
Only a year later, the Court reaffirmed the warrant requirement in the case of Trupiano v. 
United States.38 In Trupiano, Internal Revenue agents set up an undercover operation in an 
illegal distillery.39 Over the course of several weeks, the agents observed construction and 
operation of the still.40  The agents eventually raided the still, seizing the operations, searching 
the building and nearby trucks, and arresting those found within.41 No warrant was ever 
obtained42 and the seizure was ruled invalid.43  Concluding a warrant must be procured whenever 
reasonable, the agents’ failure to obtain a warrant rendered the seizure unreasonable in light of 
the exigency rationale behind the SILA exception.44   
The Court again reversed directions in United States v. Rabinowitz.45  In Rabinowitz, 
government officials received word that a stamp dealer was ordering and dealing forged stamps 
in his one-room office.46    The agents obtained an arrest warrant but did not apply for or obtain a 
search warrant.47  After arresting the defendant, the officers searched the one-room office for an 
                                                
35 Id. at 152;  n.16 (“Searches going beyond the room of arrest were upheld in the Agnello and Marron cases[]. The 
searches found to be invalid in the Go-Bart and Lefkowitz cases were so held for reasons other than the areas 
covered by the searches. It has not been the understanding of the lower federal courts that the search in every case 
must be so confined.”). 
36 Id. at 154 (“Certainly this is not a case of search for or seizure of an individual's private papers.”). 
37 Id. at 156 (Jackson, J. dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion: “The Court now goes far beyond prior 
decisions in another direction -- it permits rummaging throughout a house without a search warrant on the ostensible 
ground of looking for the instruments of a crime for which an arrest, but only an arrest, has been authorized.”). 
38 334 U.S. 699 (1948).    
39 Id. at 701. 
40 Id. at 702.   
41 Id. at 703.   
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 710. 
44 See id. at 705-06 (“And so when the agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit decided to dispense with a search warrant and 
to take matters into their own hands, they did precisely what the Fourth Amendment was designed to outlaw.”). 
45 339 U.S. 56 (1950).   




hour-and-a-half and uncovered almost 600 forged stamps.48  The Court concluded that the search 
was permissible because it was not “exploratory” in nature, but was specific to the office and to 
illegally forged stamps.49  The Court declined to adopt a rule requiring officers to acquire a 
warrant whenever practicable, 50 making Rabinowitz the most recent decision supported by the 
evidence-gathering rationale.  
Closely related to the search-incident-to-arrest caseline is the 1968 decision in Terry v. 
Ohio.51  That case answered the question of whether an officer can perform a less intrusive, pat-
down search without an arrest, but during an investigation.  The facts involved a police officer 
who noticed several youths engaged in suspicious behavior.52  While questioning the individuals, 
the officer patted-down the outside of their clothing to check for weapons.53  The Court 
concluded there “must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons 
for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an 
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the 
individual for a crime.”54   
Similarly relevant is the Court’s 1980 decision in Payton v. New York. 55  There, the Court 
confronted the issue of whether a warrant was required to enter a home absent exigent 
circumstances.  It concluded that a warrant, either arrest or search, was required to cross the 
threshold into the home.56  At the end of the opinion, the Payton Court stated “an arrest warrant 
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in 
                                                
48 Id. at 58-59.   
49 Id. at 63.   
50 Id. at 64; see also id. at 60 (“It was recognized by the framers . . . that there were reasonable searches for which no 
warrant was required.”).   
51 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
52 Id. at 6.   
53 Id. at 7.   
54 Id. at 27 (emphasis added). 
55 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
56 Id. at 589.   
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which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within.”57  It is the phrase 
“reason to believe” and its interpretations in the lower courts which is applicable to the present 
analysis.   
B. The Modern SILA Exception 
In Chimel v. California, the Court sought to settle the half-century of conflicting rationale 
behind the search-incident-to-lawful-arrest exception.58  In that case, Police arrived at Chimel’s 
house with a warrant for his arrest.59  When the defendant arrived home, the officers arrested him 
and asked for permission to “look around.”60  Chimel objected, but the officers informed him 
that they would perform the search anyway incident to his arrest.61    Over the next hour, the 
officers searched not only the entire house, but also the attic, garage, and workshop.62  The 
officers ordered Chimel’s wife to move contents in the drawers of the master bedroom where 
they found and seized incriminating objects.63   
Chimel claimed the search was improper as incident to his arrest.  The Court first examined 
the circumstances which prompted the Framers to enact the Fourth Amendment.64  The Chimel 
Court then reaffirmed the importance of the warrant requirement: “[a]bsent some grave 
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizens and the 
police.”65 “The burden is on those seeking an exemption from the requirement to show the need 
                                                
57 Id.  at 602 (emphasis added).   
58 395 U.S. 752, 758 (1969).  
59 Id. at 753. 
60 Id.    
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 754.   
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 760-61 (“the Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures must be read in light of the 
history that gave rise to the words -- a history of abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent 
causes of the Revolution.  The Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants and warrantless 
searches that had so alienated the colonists and had helped speed the movement for independence.  In the scheme of 
the Amendment, therefore, the requirement that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,” plays a crucial 
part.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
65 Id. at 761(internal citations omitted).   
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for it.”66   “The scope of a search must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible.”67   
The Court continued “it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize 
any evidence . . . [in] the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary item.”68 “There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee’s person 
and the area ‘within his immediate control.’”69 The Court then concluded the “area of immediate 
control” was the “rational limitation” for the exigency-based SILA exception.70   
Before holding the search of Chimel’s house unconstitutional, the Court cited the words of 
Judge Learned Hand:  
After arresting a man in his house, to rummage at will among his papers in 
search of whatever will convict him, appears to us to be indistinguishable from 
what might be done under a general warrant; indeed, the warrant would give more 
protection, for presumably it must be issued by a magistrate. True, by hypothesis 
the power would not exist, if the supposed offender were not found on the 
premises; but it is small consolation to know that one's papers are safe only so 
long as one is not at home.71 
 
The case which set the stage for Arizona v. Gant was the 1981 decision in New York v. 
Belton.72  In that case, the Court addressed the issue of whether a legal arrest of an automobile 
occupant puts the passenger compartment of the automobile into the permissible scope of a 
search incident to arrest, i.e., whether the interior of the vehicle is the “area within the arrestee’s 
immediate control.”73   
                                                
66 Id. at 762 (internal citations omitted). 
67 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
68 Id. at 763. 
69 Id. (emphasis added).   
70 Id. at 766 (citing Justice Jackson’s dissent from Harris, who opined and cautioned against exactly the rule the 
Court was making: “once the search is allowed to go beyond the person arrested and the objects [(not area)] upon 
him or in his immediate physical control . . .  that means no limit at all.” 331 U.S. at 197). 
71 Id. at 767-68 (citing United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926) (Hand, J.)). 
72 453 U.S. 454 (1981).   
73 Id. at 455. 
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The facts of the case were not unusual:  a police officer pulled over a vehicle for speeding.74  
When approaching the car, the officer smelled burnt marijuana and saw on the floor an envelope 
marked “Supergold,” a name he associated with marijuana.75  The officer searched the envelope 
and indeed found marijuana.76  He proceeded to search the vehicle where he found a jacket 
belonging to Belton, which contained cocaine in the pocket.77  The officer placed the four 
occupants under arrest.78   
After reaffirming an officer’s ability to search the surrounding area incident to lawful arrest, 
the Court noted the difficulty lower courts had defining the “area within the arrestee’s immediate 
control.”79   The Court ruled, seeking to establish a workable standard and bright-line rule, that 
items inside the passenger compartment of an automobile are “generally” within reach of an 
arrestee.80 Purporting to do no more than interpret Chimel in a “problematic context,” the Court 
held “when a policeman has made a lawful arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a 
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that 
automobile.”81  The rule explicitly allowed the police to examine the contents of any containers 
found within the passenger compartment, open or closed.82   
Justice Brennan authored a dissent, criticizing the Court for “turn[ing] its back” on “Chimel’s 
underlying policy concerns” and signaling a retreat from the settled search-incident-to-arrest 
                                                
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 455-56.   
76 Id. at 456. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 458-59 (examining conflicting caselaw); id. at 460 (“when a person cannot know how a court will apply a 
settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, 
nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority”). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. (claiming the holding “in no way alters the fundamental principles” of Chimel). 
82 Id. at 460-61 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).   
12 
 
analysis.83   Exceptions to the warrant requirement must be narrowly construed.84  “[I]n 
determining whether to grant an exception to the warrant requirement, courts should carefully 
consider the facts . . . focusing on the reasons supporting the exception rather than on any bright-
line rule . . . .”85  Justice Brennan concluded his opinion noting how the Court’s bright-line rule 
does not in fact apply bright-line standards, and would create far more problems than it solves.86  
“More important, because the Court’s new rule abandons the justifications underlying Chimel, it 
offers no guidance to the police officer seeking to work out these answers for himself.”87  
C. The Gant Opinion 
In 2009, the Court decided Arizona v. Gant.88  Suspect Rodney Gant was arrested for driving 
with a suspended license, handcuffed, and locked in the back of a patrol car.  89  With Gant 
secured, the officers searched his car and his jacket, finding cocaine in a jacket pocket.90 
The Belton opinion, over the previous 28 years, had been widely understood to allow a 
vehicle search incident-to-arrest as an entitlement search, allowable regardless of the suspect’s 
current location.91  The Court, seeking to clarify that interpretation, reaffirmed that a search 
incident to arrest may only include the arrestee’s person and the area within his immediate 
control.92 If during an arrest there is no possibility that the arrestee could access the area in 
                                                
83 Id. at 463-64. 
84 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 457 (1967); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). 
85 Id. (internal citations omitted).   
86 Id. at 469-470 (noting no definition of “contemporaneous,” no reasoning about why the rule is restricted to cars, 
and no definition of “interior”). 
87 Id. at 470. 
88 556 U.S. 332 (2009).   
89 Id. at 335. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 341; see also Id. at 342 (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring in 
judgment) (noting that cases allowing a search when the suspect is already detained, in the police car, or even absent 
from the scene are “legion”)). 
92 Id. at 339. 
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question, the Chimel justifications preclude a warrantless search incident to that arrest.93 
Allowing a vehicle search incident to every recent occupant’s arrest would “untether the rule 
from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.”94 “Construing Belton to allow vehicle 
searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to provide a police entitlement, 
and it is anathema to the Fourth Amendment to permit a warrantless search on that basis.”95 
Following the exigent circumstances rationale, the Court held that Chimel “authorizes police to 
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and 
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.”96   
The Court then created a second rule, the subject matter of this paper: “circumstances unique 
to the vehicle context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”97 The Court offered no analysis for 
the second prong of its holding, but instead cited Justice Scalia’s concurrence in judgment from 
Thornton.  In that opinion, Justice Scalia revisited older Court precedent which rested on the 
“evidence-gathering” rationale, defunct since Rabinowitz.98  Justice Scalia, however, offered 
minimal reasoning without cited authority for his evidence-gathering rule.  He wrote only that 
there is “nothing irrational about broader police authority to search for evidence when and where 
the perpetrator of the crime is lawfully arrested.”99 An arrest, Scalia reasoned, “distinguishes the 
arrestee from society at large, and distinguishes a search for evidence of his crime from general 
                                                
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 343.   
95 Id. at 347. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment)).   




rummaging.  Moreover, it is not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most likely to be 
found where the suspect was apprehended.”100  
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion in Gant, sharing his belief that the “Belton-
Thornton charade of officer safety” should be abandoned.101  In support of his contention, Justice 
Scalia noted typical police conduct: when an arrest is made after a roadside stop, officers don’t 
search the car for their safety, they detain the suspect in the back of the police car.102  The risk, 
he reasoned, peaks at the initial confrontation and is “not at all reduced by allowing a search of 
the stopped vehicle after the driver has been arrested and placed in the squad car.”103  Scalia 
would rule that the only reasonable search incident to vehicular arrest would be when the search 
is for evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made.104  Concluding that a majority would 
be better than a 4-1-4 opinion, Scalia joined the majority, 105 and it seems the majority 
accommodated him by adopting his evidence-gathering rule. 106 
Applying the Chimel rationales to the facts of Gant, the Court held the search 
unconstitutional because Gant was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the 
search.107  The Court also noted, referring to Scalia’s rule, that Gant was arrested for driving with 
a suspended license, “an offense for which police could not expect to find evidence in the 
passenger compartment of Gant’s car.”108  Lastly, in an effort to preempt the dissenting opinion 
                                                
100 Id. 
101 556 U.S. at 351. 
102 Id. at 351-52.   
103 Id. at 352 (emphasis in original). 
104 Id. at 353.   
105 Id. at 354.   
106 For an excellent and extensive critique of the Scalia’s contribution to the Gant opinion, see Jack Blum, Arizona v. 
Gant: Missing an Opportunity to Banish Bright Lines from the Court’s Vehicular Search Incident to Arrest 
Jurisprudence, 70 MD. L. REV 826 (2011). 




calling for Stare Decisis, the Court reviewed briefly the volatile and apparently still-unsettled 
history of the SILA exception.  109 110  
In his dissent, Justice Alito criticized the second prong of the two-part holding, noting the 
rule was taken from Thornton “without any independent explanation of its origin or justification 
and is virtually certain to confuse law enforcement officers and judges.”111  The Court was 
overruling, not clarifying, the rules in Belton and Thornton,112  and should adhere to those cases 
under Stare Decisis.113 Lastly, Justice Alito noted the unintuitive nature of the evidence-
gathering search: “the Court's new rule, which the Court takes uncritically from Justice Scalia's 
separate opinion in Thornton, raises doctrinal and practical problems that the Court makes no 
effort to address. Why, for example, is the standard for this type of evidence-gathering search 
‘reason to believe’ rather than probable cause? And why is this type of search restricted to 
evidence of the offense of arrest?”114  
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SILA: “REASONABLE TO BELIEVE” 
AUTHORITY SPLITS  
In the three years since Gant, the lower courts have had much difficulty interpreting the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  Both prongs of the holding, the return to the twin rationales of 
Chimel (part one)115 and Justice Scalia’s “reasonable to believe” standard (part two) have created 
                                                
109 Id. at 350. 
110 Strangely noting United States v. Rabinowitz, the case upon which Justice Scalia based his dissent in Thornton, 
which in turn was the basis for the second prong of the Court’s holding in Gant, had been overruled by Chimel, the 
opinion resurrected by Gant. 
111 Id. at 356.   
112 Id.  
113 Id. at 358-63.   
114 Id. at 364 (further noting “it is not easy to see why an officer should not be able to search when the officer has 
reason to believe that the vehicle in question possesses evidence of a crime other than the crime of arrest.”).   
115 Compare United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 905-06 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply Gant to a search of 
an arrestee's person) and United States v. Perdoma, 621 F.3d 745, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply Gant to 
a search of a bag recovered from an area within the arrestee's immediate control) with United States v. Shakir, 616 
F.3d 315, 318 (3d Cir.) (“the Government contends that the rule of Gant applies only to vehicle searches. We do not 
read Gant so narrowly. The Gant Court itself expressly stated its desire to keep the rule of Belton tethered to the 
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splits among the federal and state courts.  This section explores the divergent interpretations and 
the logic the adopting courts have followed interpreting part two, the portion of the Gant holding 
which has generated the widest range of divergence.   
The relevant text in the Gant opinion reads “[a]lthough it does not follow from Chimel, we 
also conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a 
lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be 
found in the vehicle."116 This holding has been interpreted both to create a bright line rule similar 
to the abrogated holding from Belton, entitling the police to a full evidence-gathering search 
whenever it is “reasonable to believe” the crime is of the type which may yield physical 
evidence, and as an evidentiary standard.  Two questions are presented: which interpretation is 
the correct one and, if an evidentiary standard is the proper construction, which standard the term 
“reasonable to believe” is meant to represent. 
A. “Reasonable to Believe” is Not an Evidentiary Standard and Can be Satisfied by the 
Nature of the Charge 
 
Some courts have interpreted the “reasonable to believe” requirement to be satisfied solely 
from the inference that evidence might be found at the place of arrest.117  This rule, termed the 
“nature-of-the-offense” rule,118 derives from the following language: “[i]n many cases, as when a 
recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the 
vehicle contains relevant evidence. But in others, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of 
arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and 
                                                                                                                                                       
justifications underlying the Chimel exception, and Chimel did not involve a car search.”) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
116 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (citing Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 628 (2004) (Scalia, J. 
concurring in judgment)).   
117 See, e.g., People v. Nottoli, 199 Cal. App. 4th 531, 554 (2011); State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247, 248 (Ct. App. 
2010); Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671, 678 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (Scalia, J., 
concurring)) (stating “not illogical to assume that evidence of a crime is most likely to be found where the suspect 
was apprehended”); Cain v. Arkansas, 2010 Ark. App. 30 (2010). 
118 See, e.g., People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1056-1057 (Colo. 2010). 
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any containers therein.”119  “Whereas Belton and Thornton were arrested for drug offenses, Gant 
was arrested for driving with a suspended license - an offense for which police could not expect 
to find evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant's car.”120  
The nature-of-the-offense rule contains within it two further potential interpretations. The 
applying courts have not fully explained the logic behind their decisions; they have not explained 
whether the “reasonable to believe” portion of the Gant holding applies to the type of the crime, 
i.e., whether it must be reasonable to believe that the crime is of the type which may yield 
physical evidence; or whether the “reasonable to believe” language is superfluous and instead the 
phrase “the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment” 
supports the courts’ rules.  Both interpretations will be analyzed in the following section.   
Courts applying this standard have, however, nearly identical rationale for adopting the 
nature-of-the-offense rule as opposed to other interpretations.  In State v. Cantrell, the Idaho 
Court of Appeals applied the nature-of-the-offense interpretation to a DUI stop.121  In that case, 
Cantrell, driving the wrong way down a one-way street, was pulled over for suspicion of driving 
under the influence of alcohol.122  He admitted to consuming alcohol and was detained in the 
back of the police cruiser.123  The officers then searched Cantrell’s vehicle and discovered 
marijuana under the driver’s seat.124   
                                                
119 Gant, 556 U.S. at  343-344 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
120 Id. 






The Cantrell Court concluded first that “reasonable to believe” did not equate to probable 
cause.125  The court also noted equating reasonable to believe with probable cause would render 
the automobile exception to the warrant requirement redundant.126     
The Cantrell Court next dismissed the suggestion that reasonable to believe equated to a 
Terry-like standard that required some additional information suggesting evidence can be found 
in the vehicle.127  Such a standard, the court reasoned, could not be proper because analysis 
would turn on the suspect’s ability to hide evidence.128   
The court decided the nature-of-the-offense interpretation was the correct one.  “[T]he 
offense of arrest will supply a basis for the search.  A search for this purpose is authorized 
irrespective of whether evidence is known to be located in the vehicle.”129 Because DUI is an 
offense for which evidence might potentially be found in the passenger compartment, the 
Cantrell Court concluded the search was reasonable and proper under Gant.130  
B. Reasonable to Believe is an Evidentiary Standard Akin to the Terry “Reasonable 
Suspicion” Standard. 
 
Some courts have applied the “reasonable to believe” language as a minimum evidentiary 
requirement to conduct a search – the arresting officers must have some particularized facts 
which indicate evidence of the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle to be searched.  
Requiring a probability lower than probable cause, courts have adopted standards mirroring 
those standards developed in response to Payton v. New York131 and Terry v. Ohio.132 The courts 
                                                
125 Id. at 252 (“The . . . Supreme Court is certainly aware of the meaning attached to particular standards.  Had the 
Court intended to adopt the probable cause standard, it would have done so.”). 
126 See Id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) ( holding automobile exception allows a full 
search of a vehicle if the officers have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of criminal activity)). 
127 Id. at 253. 
128 Id.  (“DUI evidence that is in plain view, or partially hidden . . . would supply a basis for the search, whereas 
evidence that is carefully hidden would not.”). 
129 Id. (citing Gant, 556 U.S. at 342).   
130 Id. at 254-55.    
131 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
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interpreting Payton apply a standard lower than probable cause, but higher than the Terry 
standard.133 134   In the next section, I analyze arguments for this standard as both equivalent and 
not-equivalent to the Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard.   
Relying on Sixth Circuit precedent interpreting Payton, the Court in United States v. Reagan 
equated the phrases “reasonable belief” and “reasonable to believe.”135 The argument that the 
Gant standard is equivalent to the Payton or Terry standards relies on the assumption those two 
phrases are equivalent.136   “[R]easonable belief,” the Sixth Circuit has held, “is established by 
looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the circumstances."137  In the 
Payton “reason to believe” context, the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation is in accordance with the 
weight of federal authority.138    The Reagan Court adopted that standard in its entirety and 
phrased the proper test as “reasonable to believe, based upon common sense factors and the 
totality of the circumstances, that evidence of the offense of the arrest is inside.”139   
The Reagan Court declined to adopt the Cantrell nature-of-the-offense rule for three reasons:   
First, that rule contemplates that all criminal charges be clearly divided into those that yield 
                                                                                                                                                       
132 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
133 United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (citing United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 
477, 482 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not expressly decided what is meant by the 
phrase ‘reasonable to believe’ in Gant. But it has stated that a ‘reasonable belief standard’ is ‘lesser’ than a probable 
cause standard”)). 
134 I have included within this rule section the “hybrid rule” which has surfaced in some courts.  See People v. 
Evans, 200 Cal. App. 4th 735, 751 (2011) (“We conclude a reasonable belief to search for evidence of the offense of 
arrest exists when the nature of the offense, considered in conjunction with the particular facts of the case, gives rise 
to a degree of suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited intrusions such as investigatory stops.”).  That 
rule, considering the facts of the case specifically, is sufficiently analogous to the rules in this section to analyze 
them together. 
135 Reagan, 713 F. Supp at 728.  (“This Court is unable to perceive any meaningful difference between the phrases 
‘reasonable belief’ and ‘reasonable to believe.’”). 
136 Though the phrases are remarkably similar, there is indeed a semantic difference between the specific “[officers 
must possess] reasonable belief” and the general “it is reasonable to believe.”  This paper necessarily assumes the 
differences is immaterial to the outcome.   
137 Pruitt, 458 F.3d at 482.   
138 See United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d. 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216-17 
(8th Cir. 1996); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 
1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005).  
139 Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 728.    
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physical evidence or those that do not yield physical evidence.140  While such distinctions may 
be simple when examining minor traffic offenses, the lines begin to blur when one considers 
charges such as telephone harassment.141 “Reasonable people could disagree about exactly what 
can be considered ‘physical evidence,’ and about whether there ‘might’ be any physical evidence 
of telephone harassment.”142  
The second problem the Reagan Court raised against the nature-of-the-offense rule was the 
inevitable “piecemeal” decision making establishing those crimes for which it is “reasonable to 
believe” evidence may be found in the vehicle.143  The many jurisdictions across the country 
applying their specific criminal law, which in many cases requires different elements or uses 
different terminology, would result in dramatic inconsistencies in case law.144  At its worst, the 
nature-of-the-offense approach could yield results where one jurisdiction declares a specific 
crime might per se yield physical evidence, when another jurisdiction would declare the same 
crime per se incapable of yielding physical evidence.145 The resulting uncertainty among law 
enforcement officers and citizens alike weighs against the nature-of-the-offense rule.146  
 Lastly and most significantly, according to the Reagan Court, would be the unintended or 
unreasonable results the per se nature-of-the-offense rule could create.147  The court illustrated 
by means of example: if a police officer were to witness a bar patron consume several drinks at 
an establishment in a short period of time and then witness that patron get in his car and drive 
off, the officer would have probable cause to pull over and arrest that patron for driving while 
                                                










intoxicated.148  But by the very fact that the officer saw the patron in the bar, he would have 
specific facts and knowledge indicating that there was no evidence of DUI to be found in the 
vehicle.149  That result would be contrary to Gant.150 The officer would be entitled to search the 
patron’s car because of a per se rule declaring DUI the type of crime for which it is reasonable to 
believe evidence may be found in the vehicle despite the specific facts indicating no such 
evidence exists.  
C. Reasonable to Believe is Equivalent to Probable Cause 
The Eastern District of Washington has held the standard “reasonable to believe” to the 
highest evidentiary requirement of any authority in the post-Gant automobile search context: 
probable cause.  The court in United States v. Grote151 examined Ninth Circuit precedent from 
United States v. Gorman,152 which interpreted Payton’s “reason to believe” standard as “the 
same standard of reasonableness inherent in probable cause.”153  The court in Grote, the like 
Reagan Court, had little difficulty drawing the correlation between the language in the Payton 
standard and the Gant standard.154  The test under Ninth Circuit precedent is whether there is 
probable cause to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the 
particular vehicle to be searched.155 
                                                
148 Id. 
149 Id.   
150 Id. at 733 (“[The officer’s] firsthand observation of the driver drinking several beers gives him a good reason to 
believe that no evidence of DUI is contained  in the vehicle. This result seems completely contrary to Gant's 
statement that a warrantless search of a vehicle's passenger compartment incident to arrest is lawful when ‘it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of the arrest.’ The Court therefore rejects Brown's 
interpretation of Gant.”) (internal citations omitted).  
151 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (E.D. Wash. 2009). 
152 314 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir 2002). 
153 Id. at 1110-11 (internal quotations omitted). 
154 Grote, 639 F. Supp. at 1203. (equating “reasonable to believe” with “reason to believe”). 
155 Id. at 1205.   
22 
 
Gorman based its conclusion on older case law from the Fifth Circuit, which also equated the 
probable cause standard to reasonable belief.156   In United States v. Woods, the court reasoned 
that reasonable belief embodies the same standard as probable cause, but required a different 
description because the term “probable cause” had become a term of art.157  Probable cause 
connotes a determination by a neutral and detached magistrate.158 Reasonable belief, though 
embodying the same standard, allows an officer to make the probability determination himself 
without requiring another trip to the magistrate.159 At the time of this paper, however, the Fifth 
Circuit has not extended its Payton reasonable belief standard to the post-Gant vehicular search 
context.   
III. RIPENESS OF THE ISSUE – IS SUPREME COURT INTERVENTION 
NECESSARY?  
When confronted with a pervasive authority split among lower courts, many legal observers 
contemplate whether resolution by the United States Supreme Court is necessary and, if so, how 
quickly that intervention must come.  With a docket of only around 80 cases per year,160 
however, the Court can only grant or expedite certiorari to answer the most urgent questions. 
This section explores briefly the urgency of resolution by looking to some relevant common 
factors which lead to grants of certiorari: the depth and width of the split, frequency with which 
the issue arises, the need for constitutional uniformity, and the severity of the repercussions for a 
continued divide.161 Based on these factors, I conclude Supreme Court intervention is 
                                                
156 United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Vasquez v. Snow, 616 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 
1980) (“For want of a better verbal formulation, we drew upon the jurisprudence of ‘probable cause.’”). 
157 Id. at 665.   
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx#faqgi9 (“the Court hears between 75 and 80 cases”) (last visited 4/24/2012).   
161 see Nicholas J. Wagoner, , 4 Reasons Why the Supreme Court Reviews Circuit Splits; 4 Reasons Why the FMLA 




unnecessary at this stage and instead urge the lower courts to adopt the appropriate rule going 
forward.   
Three factors encourage intervention: (1) the frequency with which the issue arises, (2) the 
need for uniformity, and (3) severity of the repercussions of a continued divide.  The first factor 
undeniably lends towards a definitive resolution.  With over 200 million licensed drivers in the 
United States162 and an average of near 40,000 arrests per day,163 arrests and searches in an 
automobile context arise very frequently.   
The need for uniformity also encourages resolution.  The Constitution favors uniform 
application of laws as interpreted by the Supreme Court.164  The American citizenry should not 
be exposed to inconsistent constitutional interpretations across jurisdictional boundaries, 
especially when a right as important as the freedom from unreasonable searches hangs in the 
balance.  Lastly, uniformity lends to efficiency in government.  When the judiciary is able to rely 
on similar decisions from other courts and police officers are allowed to share tactics and 
experience through manuals and other training, the judicial and executive branches function 
more efficiently as wholes.   
The repercussions of allowing this ongoing split, though severe, are not as severe as they 
may initially appear.  The nature-of-the-offense interpretation, as I conclude later,165 is a 
functional continuation of the Belton entitlement search which the Court in Gant expressly ruled 
unconstitutional.  Each automobile search in the jurisdictions which adopted that interpretation is 
potentially a violation of the Fourth Amendment for which the arrestee is left without redress.  
                                                
162 U.S. DOT, Licensed Drivers by Age and Sex, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/onh00/onh2p4.htm (last visited 
4/17/2012). 
163 U.S. DOJ, Estimated Number of Arrests, http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html (last visited 
4/17/2012). 
164 See Const. Art. III §1 (“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court”); Const. 
Art. II(“the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme law of the land.”); see also Wagoner, supra note 161. 
165 See supra Part. IV.A-B.   
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Those jurisdictions, however, are not only few in number, but as of the time of this paper, the 
courts which have adopted the nature-of-the-offense rule are not courts of last resort; the problem 
can still be corrected by the respective state supreme courts. 166    
The remaining factor, the depth and width of the split weighs against immediate resolution 
by the Supreme Court.  The divergence of authority here, though running fault-lines in at least 
three directions,167 does not mandate certiorari.  Few state supreme courts and only one federal 
circuit court have definitively spoken on the issue as of this writing.168  Those jurisdictions which 
have strayed from the Gant holding are still able to correct their error. 
While the numerical quantity of factors weighs in favor of swift resolution, the only factor 
itself which truly urges haste is the ongoing constitutional violations in the nature-of-the-offense 
jurisdictions.   Because the jurisdictions which have adopted that interpretation are still able to 
correct the error, I conclude this matter is not sufficiently pressing to require resolution by the 
Supreme Court at this time.   
IV. ANALYSIS – “REASOABLE TO BELIEVE:” IN SEARCH OF THE PROPER 
STANDARD 
This section is dedicated to analyzing the interpretations of Scalia’s “reasonable to believe” 
standard and determining which is the most appropriate.  I conclude that the North Carolina 
approach, which holds “reasonable to believe” to be a standard parallel to Terry, is the correct 
standard.169  
 
                                                
166 See supra note 117.     
167 See Discussion supra Part II. 
168 See State v. Mbacke, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (N.C. 2012); United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 26 (D.C. Cir. 
2010); but see Rose v. Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. 2010) (hinting that a Terry-like standard may be 
appropriate: “we are satisfied that [the officer] did not possess the requisite reasonable suspicion”); United States v. 
Williams, 616 F.3d 760, 765-766 (8th Cir. Mo. 2010) (hinting that probable cause may be the appropriate 
standard:“the police had probable cause to believe that evidence relevant to the drug crime would be found in  the 
vehicle.”). 
169 State v. Mbacke, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (N.C. 2012). 
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A. The Nature-of-the-Offense Rule 
The nature-of-the-offense rule, as a brief reminder, is that the nature of the offense of arrest 
alone provides the basis for a vehicular search.  The first of two possible interpretations is that 
the courts simply ignore the “reasonable to believe” language and instead rely solely on the 
“nature of the charge of arrest” language from Gant.170  The second applies “reasonable to 
believe” to the type of crime; it must be reasonable to believe the crime serving as the basis for 
the arrest might yield physical evidence.  Put differently, when different types of crimes blur the 
lines between those which might yield physical evidence and those that might not, the second 
interpretation permits officers to search when they reasonably believe the crime is of the type 
which might yield physical evidence. 
1.  “Reasonable to Believe” is Superfluous – the Strict Per Se Categories  
This first interpretation of the nature-of-the-offense rule is the least appropriate of all 
interpretations because it ignores opinion language, adoption would result in almost a zero-net-
change from the Belton rule, and it conflicts with the rest of the Gant opinion.  If this 
interpretation were followed, the promise of any constitutional protection in an automobile 
search context turns illusory. 
The most obvious argument against this interpretation is simply that, were it adopted, it 
would make the language in the Gant opinion superfluous.  Surely Justice Stevens and Justice 
Scalia did not write extra words into their opinions without cause.171  This argument carries with 
it more weight when the supposedly superfluous word is “reasonably.”  A former law professor 
of mine once taught his class “when you see the word ‘reasonable’ in an opinion, the odds are 
                                                
170 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343-344 (2009) (“the offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the 
passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein.”). 
171 Id. at 343; Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004). 
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pretty good you’re looking at a legal standard.”172  I have found this statement to be remarkably 
accurate.173  Omitting words expressly written into a holding does great violence to the opinion 
and weighs against using this interpretation. 
The next argument is similarly powerful: the net result of adopting this interpretation would 
only be a slight dilution of Belton.174  If the words “it is reasonable to believe that” are omitted 
from the Gant opinion as this interpretation requires, the holding is left reading “circumstances 
unique to the automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when [. . .] evidence of the 
offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”175  This interpretation hinges the ability to 
search the vehicle on the word “might.”  If the reasonableness language is not applied to the 
word “might,” the rule becomes one where a search is allowed in any circumstances when it is 
within the realm of possibility that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found within the 
vehicle, without regard to probability.  Searches conducted independent of the probability of 
actually finding evidence are entitlement searches and mark a return to Belton.  
Several examples will better illustrate the point.  In the DUI context, which is the underlying 
offense in many of the cases cited, an officer, having probable cause to arrest a driver for driving 
under the influence, would be allowed to search the driver’s car each and every time he made an 
arrest for DUI because the officer might find empty beer cans in the car. In this example, it is 
within the realm of possibility that beer cans could be found in the car, despite no indication of 
                                                
172 Daniel M. Katz, Professor, Michigan State University College of Law., Criminal Procedure I (8/20/2011 – 
12/9/2011).   
173 See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (beyond-a-reasonable-doubt); Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (“the proper standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective 
assistance.”); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 797 (1973) (“the Commission had failed to make a 
determination of reasonable cause”);   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (a reasonable period of time); 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993) (“to be admitted only if the facts or data 
are ‘of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field’”).   
174 See People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1056-1057 (Colo. 2010). 
175 Gant, 556 U.S. at 335 (alterations mine).   
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probability.  This logic was employed by the courts in State v. Cantrell176 and People v 
Nottoli.177 
While appearing initially like an allowable inference and a rule fit for adoption, the flaw in 
logic becomes apparent as the example becomes more extreme.  Assume now that, serving a 
warrant issued with probable cause to arrest, a police officer pulls over and arrests a driver for 
the crime of soliciting a murder-for-hire.  It is within the realm of possibility (that is, not 
impossible) that the officer may find a contract document bearing both the driver’s and the 
murderer’s signature that clearly illustrates the terms of the murder for hire including the target’s 
name; time, place, and method of the killing; quantity of the payment; and the driver’s motive for 
soliciting the assassination properly sealed by a notary public.  That possibility, no matter how 
remote, would support a search of the arrestee’s vehicle.  The end result is a system functionally 
indistinguishable from Belton. 
Lastly, an interpretation ignoring the reasonableness requirement would itself be at odds with 
the rest of the Gant opinion.  Gant, based on Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Thornton, draws a line 
between crimes for which evidence might be located in the vehicle and for those it might not.178  
This distinction, however, quickly evaporates when exposed to the “realm of possibility” 
argument.  The Gant court cites an arrest for a traffic violation as one such crime for which no 
evidence might be found in the car.179  But it is within the realm of possibility that the driver had 
an appointment slip inside the car, indicating a reason why a driver may be speeding, or a text on 
his phone to a friend that read “my driver’s license is suspended, but I am going to drive over to 
                                                
176 149 Idaho 247, 248 (Ct. App. 2010). 
177 199 Cal. App. 4th 531, 554 (2011).   
178 Gant, 556 U.S. at 335. 
179 Id. at 343-44. 
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your house anyway.”  Because that evidence might be found in the car, a search would be 
allowable under those circumstances contrary to the express language of Gant.180   
Ignoring the reasonableness language in the Gant opinion would be at odds with not only the 
remainder of the Gant opinion, but would ignore the tenets of construction by failing to give 
meaning to all the words.  Furthermore, this rule would produce no net change in law from 
Belton aside from requiring our police officers to have a modicum of creativity to justify a 
search.   For these reasons, I conclude this interpretation of the “reasonable to believe” standard 
is inappropriate. 
2. “Reasonable to Believe” the Crime of Arrest Might Produce Physical Evidence 
The alternative breed of nature-of-the-offense interpretation applies the reasonableness 
language to the crime itself, presenting the question of whether the officers might reasonably 
believe that the type of crime itself might produce physical evidence.  This alternative is 
inappropriate for largely the same reasons as the strict per se variant: because the interpretation 
continues to result in entitlement searches, would likely result in conflicting interpretive case 
law, and threatens to devour the Chimel rationales the Court in Gant sought to reinstate.   
Entitlement searches, as the Gant Court recognized, are “anathema to the Fourth 
Amendment.”181  Belton, as interpreted by many lower courts, allowed a search of an arrestee’s 
vehicle absent the Chimel justifications, i.e., when the arrestee could not gain access to a weapon 
or destructible evidence at the time of the search (or when the arrestee was no longer at the scene 
of the arrest when the search took place).182  An interpretation of the “reasonable to believe” 
                                                
180 See Nottoli, 199 Cal. App. 4th at 557 (allowing search of driver’s phone for evidence of driving under the 
influence). 
181 Gant, 556 U.S. at 347.    
182 See, e.g., Rainey v. Commonwealth, 197 S. W. 3d 89, 94-95 (Ky. 2006) (applying Belton when the arrestee was 
apprehended 50 feet from the vehicle); Black v. State, 810 N.E.2d 713, 716 (Ind. 2004) (applying Belton when the 
arrestee was apprehended inside an auto repair shop and the vehicle was parked outside); United States v. 
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standard restricting only the types of offenses which allow an entitlement search does little to 
prevent further constitutional wrongs. 
Applying the reasonableness standard to the types of crimes, i.e., restricting those types 
which might yield physical evidence, without any requirement as to the probability of actually 
finding that physical evidence, would be nothing more than a slightly diluted version of Belton’s 
entitlement searches.  The resulting case law would (and already has) draw up per se rules 
allowing entitlement searches whenever the crime for arrest passed a court’s test. The results 
could potentially be worse than the strict per se rule.  If a court were to declare a type of crime 
per se a type that cannot yield physical evidence, officers may encounter scenarios where the 
facts still, in their judgment, make it reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest 
might be found in the car, allowing officers to sometimes circumvent court holdings. For 
example, telephone harassment may be declared a crime per se incapable of producing physical 
evidence.183  But a police officer may solicit from the arrestee that the arrestee has a journal in 
which he records all of his daily activities somewhere in his car.  The officer would have reason 
to believe that evidence of the crime of telephone harassment would be found in the car, 
expressly contrary to prior judicial rulings.   
The holdings in Cantrell and Nottoli are examples of such per se line-drawing; both courts 
held that if the offense of arrest is DUI, then the officer is entitled to search the vehicle.184  Many 
courts have already hinted that if possession of drugs or a firearm is the offense of arrest, then an 
officer may search.185  Theft is on its way to becoming such a crime.186   
                                                                                                                                                       
McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding a search that commenced five minutes after the arrestee 
was removed from the scene); United States v. Snook, 88 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). 
183 See Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 732 (contemplating the uncertain nature of whether telephone harassment could 
produce physical evidence). 
184 Cantrell, 149 Idaho at 248; Nottoli, 199 Cal. App. 4th at 557. 
185 See, e.g., Seth W. Stoughton, Modern Police Practices: Arizona v. Gant’s Illusory Restriction of Vehicle 
Searches Incident to Arrest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1727 n151 (citing United States v. Shakur, 394 F. App'x 974, 976 (4th 
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Establishing nearly per se categories would have the effect of creating very narrow 
distinctions within those categories, lending further to unpredictability.  It is not difficult to 
imagine a situation where theft of a standard bicycle is not a crime for which it is reasonable to 
believe the evidence, the bicycle, might be found in a compact car (it would not fit), but theft of a 
child’s bicycle or a unicycle would be.  It is also easy to imagine that the search for the very 
same stolen bicycle may be allowable if the driver was operating a car with best-in-class trunk 
space, but not a competing manufacturer’s model.  The resulting unpredictability is precisely the 
evil the Reagan Court sought to avoid.187   
Creating per se rules allowing searches based only on the crime of arrest also presents issues 
of conflicting case law.  Different jurisdictions, especially different states with unique wording 
and elements in criminal law statutes, would create discrepancies in types of crimes which allow 
a search.  Jurisdictional inconsistencies would only be compounded by the inevitably narrow 
distinctions discussed above.  Officers and citizens alike would have to endure the unpredictable 
nature of a case-by-case analysis in which the constitutionality of each search hinges on minute 
details, interpretations, or guesswork. 
Applying the reasonableness language only to establish whether the offense of arrest is of the 
type which allows a search of an arrestee’s vehicle would effectively amount to only a moderate 
dilution of the Belton entitlement search, which was clearly abrogated by the Gant Court.  
Allowing entitlement searches, only based on a different theory, would again threaten to devour 
the Chimel rationales.  For of these reasons, I conclude that neither ignoring the reasonableness 
                                                                                                                                                       
Cir. 2010) (holding that a vehicle search incident to arrest for a drug offense was justified under Gant); United States 
v. Hayden, 389 F. App'x 544, 549 (7th Cir. 2010)).   
186 See Brown v. State, 24 So.3d 671 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009) (theft of wallets).  
187 United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 732 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (“This piecemeal approach to classifying 
offenses could lead to jurisprudential inconsistencies.”). 
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language nor applying it to the type of offense is the proper interpretation of the Gant Court’s 
holding.   
B. Reasonable to Believe – a Standard Less Than Probable Cause 
The rules adopted by the courts in United States v. Reagan188 and State v. Mbacke189 apply 
the reasonableness standard as a required level of probability that evidence of the crime of arrest 
will be found inside the car to be searched.  The Reagan Court required “a particularized and 
articulable reason to believe” that evidence is contained inside the car, but that reason to believe 
need not rise to the level of probable cause.190 The Mbacke court equated the standard to the 
Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard.191  An evidentiary-requirement interpretation of Gant is 
the most proper of the diverging interpretations because it allows for a minimum level of 
constitutional protection for the arrestee, maintains the rationale behind the motor vehicle 
exception to the warrant requirement, flows naturally from prior decisions interpreting the 
“reasonable to believe” standard, and does minimal violence to the wording of the Gant holding 
itself.   
The most important benefit to adopting the “particularized and articulable reason” approach 
is the constitutional protection afforded the arrestee against general exploratory or rummaging 
searches, the central theme of Gant192 and a requirement wholly lacking from the nature-of-the-
offense approach.  It is well settled in American law that the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
general rummaging and exploratory searches to find whatever there is to be found.193 In Gant the 
                                                
188 Id. at 733.   
189 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (N.C. 2012). 
190 713 F. Supp. 2d at 733.   
191 721 S.E.2d at 222; see also People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Colo. 2010). (“The Court's use of 
phrases like "reasonable to believe" and "reasonable basis to believe" is a further indication that it intends some 
degree of articulable suspicion”). 
192 Gant, 556 U.S. at 347. 
193 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
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Court expressly proscribed entitlement searches.194 Requiring some specific information leading 
to the belief that evidence of the crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle comports with the 
rationale in Chimel and prevents those forbidden rummaging, entitlement searches.   
While still affording the arrestee minimal constitutional protection, the “particularized and 
articulable” rule does not obliterate the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.  
Recognizing that cars are different from houses in that they are mobile, and thus more prone to 
disappear or be cleansed of incriminating evidence, the Court long ago in Carroll v. United 
States195 held that officers may search a vehicle without first obtaining a warrant if they have 
probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime may be found therein.  An evidentiary 
standard akin to, but distinct from, probable cause saves the automobile exception, while a 
standard mirroring probable cause would be superfluous entirely.  Assuming true Justice Scalia’s 
observation in Thornton, that evidence of the crime of arrest is more likely to be found in the 
suspect’s location, 196  a lowered probability requirement for an evidentiary search is logically 
proper and makes useful all words in the Gant holding.  
Left open still is the question of whether that standard is equivalent to the standard 
articulated in Terry or whether it is a separate standard altogether.  The next subsections 
contemplate the answer. 
1. “Reasonable to Believe” is Equivalent to the Payton “Reason to Believe” 
There are at least two persuasive arguments indicating the “reasonable to believe” standard is 
distinct from the Terry standard: first, that same terminology has been long associated with the 
Payton standard and is in some sense inconsistent with the Terry standard.  Second, there is 
                                                
194 Gant, 556 U.S. at 347. 
195 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925). 
196 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (2004). 
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established case law applying the majority Payton standard.  Holding “reasonable to believe” 
different in the Gant context than it is in the Payton context would be confusing.   
The opinion in Gant phrases its holding “we also conclude that circumstances unique to the 
automobile context justify a search incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that 
evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”197  It stands to reason that if the 
Court intended to adopt the probable cause standard, it would have done so.198  Similarly, it 
seems obvious that if the Court intended to adopt the reasonable suspicion standard from Terry, 
it would have done so.  Thus the reasonable to believe standard could be an evidentiary standard 
distinct from either probable cause or reasonable suspicion.   
An analysis of the language used in light of its dictionary definition lends to the same 
conclusion.  Like the court in Reagan, I am unable to perceive any meaningful difference 
between the phrases “reasonable to believe” and “reasonable belief.”199  Similarly, the only 
difference I am able to perceive between the phrases “reasonable belief” and “reasonable 
suspicion” is the substitution of the word “belief” for the word “suspicion.”  The word “belief” is 
defined as “[a] state of mind which regards the existence of something as likely or relatively 
certain.”200  The word “suspicion” is defined as “[t]he apprehension or imagination of the 
existence of something wrong based only on inconclusive or slight evidence.”201  The term 
“belief” both connotes and denotes a stronger conviction of truth than does “suspicion.”  Thus 
the term “reasonable to believe” is most logically interpreted as a similar standard to Terry’s 
                                                
197 Gant, 556 U.S. at 335.   
198 State v. Cantrell, 149 Idaho 247, 252 (Ct. App. 2010); see also United States v. Page, 679 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 
(E.D. Va. 2009) (“It is logical to assume that the Court's choice of words was carefully chosen and hence 
distinguishable from the more familiar standards of probable cause, articulable suspicion, or totality of the 
circumstances.”). 
199 Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
200 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 175 (9th ed. 2009). 
201 Id. at 1585. 
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“reasonable suspicion,” though requiring a higher level of conviction or evidence than does 
reasonable suspicion to match the intensity of the word “belief.” 
There been significant interpretation of the “reason to believe” standard from Payton by the 
circuit courts.  The weight of authority in prior decisions interpreting that standard advanced a 
common sense, totality of the circumstances analysis requiring an evidentiary standard lower 
than probable cause.202  Following the Reagan Court’s lead, a deciding court could equate with 
little imagination the “reasonable to believe” and “reasonable belief” terminology. 203 Payton 
was also decided in 1980; considering the wealth of case law available interpreting the Payton 
standard, both federal and state, adopting that standard in the Gant context appears a prudent 
choice.   
2. “Reasonable to Believe” is Equivalent to Terry “Reasonable Suspicion” 
There are at least three strong arguments which promote the interpretation of reasonable to 
believe as equivalent to reasonable suspicion: First, that the “reason to believe” language also 
appeared in Terry v. Ohio, in which the Court first outlined the reasonable suspicion test and 
appeared to equate the two.204  Second, Terry also has been applied in remarkably similar 
situations as interpreted in Michigan v. Long.205  Third, the reasonable suspicion based on 
articulable facts standard is one of the most prevalent and settled standards in all of criminal 
procedure.   
                                                
202 See United States v. Route, 104 F.3d 59, 62-3 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Risse, 83 F.3d 212, 216-17 (8th 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 
(3d. Cir. 1995) United States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. Fla. 1995); United States v. Thomas, 368 
U.S. App. D.C. 285, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1226 (10th Cir. Utah 
1999). 
203 Reagan, 713 F. Supp 2d at 728.   
204 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (U.S. 1968) (“Officer McFadden had reasonable grounds to believe that petitioner 
was armed and dangerous.”). 
205 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
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The Court in Terry v. Ohio allowed police to perform a limited search of a person when the 
officer could point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, [which] reasonably warrant that intrusion.”206   The officer, the 
Court concluded, must have “reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous 
individual.”207  This standard, structurally and phonetically, is remarkably similar to the Scalia 
standard which allows searches when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime 
of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”208  Equating those two standards would not be a risky 
proposition. 
Furthermore, in Michigan v. Long,209 the Court applied the Terry standard to the search of the 
passenger compartment of an automobile (limited to those areas in which a weapon may be 
placed or hidden).  Those searches are allowable if the police officer possesses “a reasonable 
belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the 
suspect may gain immediate control of weapons."210 If officers are allowed to search a car for 
weapons when they possess a reasonable belief that the car contained weapons, it would make 
logical sense to allow the police also to search the same car if they possessed a reasonable belief 
that the car contains evidence of the crime of arrest.  Holding the two searches to different 
standards when they use similar language and both tests allow warrantless searches in the vehicle 
context would make little sense.   
                                                
206 Terry, 392 U.S. at  21.   
207 Id. at 27.    
208 Gant, 556 U.S. at 343. 
209 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983).   
210 Id. (quotations omitted).   
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 Terry v. Ohio, lastly, has become super-precedent in American jurisprudence.  In the 43 
years since the case was decided, the Terry standard been applied to many areas of law,211 a 
substantial number of cases, and in a wide variety of factual scenarios.212  The wealth of case law 
alone available to future courts in interpreting the Scalia search may justify its usage.213  Because 
of the massive body of case law interpreting the Terry standard and the uncanny resemblance 
between the Michigan v. Long standard and the Scalia standard in Gant, I join the Supreme Court 
of North Carolina in concluding that the Terry interpretation of “reasonable to believe” is the 
correct one.214  
C. Reasonable to Believe is Equivalent to Probable Cause  
The Eastern District of Washington, in United States v. Grote,215 following Ninth Circuit 
precedent from Payton, has been the only court to equate probable cause with the “reasonable to 
believe” language from Gant. The Ninth Circuit’s adoption of that standard is one of semantics:  
adopting courts have drawn a line parallel to probable cause but have distinguished the 
terminology.216  Supporting rationale for this position is sparse.   
The court in United States v. Woods offered the reasoning that the “reason to believe” 
language mirrored the language embodied in the principal of probable cause.217  Because of the 
similarity of the language used to describe the standards, the Fifth Circuit decided that the two 
standards were actually the same, but the term “probable cause” was inappropriate because that 
                                                
211 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (searches in schools); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 
(1987) (searches in government workplaces); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990) (protective sweeps 
through houses). 
212 See State v. Mbacke, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (N.C. 2012) (“In addition, law enforcement officers and courts have 
worked with the Terry standard for decades, making application of Gant's similar objective standard a 
straightforward matter.”). 
213 See Id.   
214 Id.   
215 629 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (E.D. Wash. 2009). 
216 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1977). 
217 Id, at 665 (internal citations omitted). 
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term connoted intervention of a judicial magistrate.218  That phraseology also, however, mirrors 
the words used in United States v. Terry and its supporting case law.219  
There is another consideration which, depending on the court’s objective, could weigh very 
strongly for or very strongly against adoption of the probable cause standard.  In Carroll v. 
United States,220 the Court first recognized the automobile exception to the warrant requirement; 
if an officer has probable cause to believe that illegal material is contained in a car, he may 
search it without a warrant issued by judicial officer.221  If a standard less than probable cause 
were used to determine when it is “reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest 
may be found in the vehicle,” Scalia’s rule would create an exception to the warrant requirement 
distinct from the automobile exception, which follows his logic in Thornton.222 If, however, a 
standard equivalent to probable cause were adopted, then both exceptions would allow a vehicle 
search if the officer had probable cause to believe that the vehicle had contraband or evidence of 
a crime.  The result then, of course, would be that the second prong of the Gant holding was 
meaningless, a mere recitation of the Carroll rule.   
If the objective of the adopting court was to preserve Scalia’s evidence-gathering rule, to 
make use of all of the Gant opinion language, or to give full respect to the majority’s opinion, 
probable cause would be inappropriate.  There have, however, been critics strongly opposed to 
the adoption of Scalia’s rule, hinting even that its adoption may have been the result of 
extortion.223  If a reviewing court sought to push the SILA doctrine towards simplicity and away 
from ill-fitting bright-line rules, there would be no better opportunity than to equate “reasonable 
                                                
218 Id. 
219 See supra Part III.B.2. 
220  267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
221 Id. at 154.   
222 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 630 (2004) (“There is nothing irrational about broader police authority 
to search for evidence when and where the perpetrator of a crime is lawfully arrested.”). 
223 See Jack Blum, Arizona v. Gant: Missing an Opportunity to Banish Bright Lines from the Court’s Vehicular 
Search Incident to Arrest Jurisprudence, 70 MD. L. REV 826, 866-67 (2011). 
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to believe” with probable cause.  Boiling away Scalia’s prong into the automobile exception 
would transform the Gant holding into a pure return to Chimel.   
There are at least two more compelling arguments that lend against adoption of the probable 
cause standard.  First, because the language of the opinion, when considered both textually and 
historically, does not support that interpretation.  Second, because the majority of other federal 
circuits have rejected the Ninth’s interpretation.   
The Court is more than familiar with the probable cause standard. Indeed, the probable cause 
requirement and phraseology is as old as the Constitution itself.224  As the court in United States 
v. Pruitt,225 among others, noted, if the Court intended to adopt probable cause as the standard, it 
would have done so.226  The ease with which the majority could have written “probable cause,” 
but elected not to, weighs against adoption of that standard.   
Lastly, the Federal Courts have largely rejected an equation with probable cause.  As noted 
by the Sixth Circuit in Pruitt,227 the majority of circuits which had ruled by the time Pruitt was 
decided adopted under Payton a common sense factor and totality of the circumstances test.228  
Such a predominant view surely weighs against the wisdom of adopting the probable cause 
standard for the term “reasonable to believe.”  
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Search Incident to Arrest exception to the warrant requirement has had a mixed history.  
The Court pitted two competing rationales against another, vying to support the SILA doctrine: 
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the exigent circumstances rationale, which allows an officer to search the person of the arrestee 
and the immediately surrounding area for any weapons which may be used against the officer 
and for any evidence the suspect may destroy before the officer can stop him; and the evidence 
gathering rationale, which assumes that evidence of wrongdoing is more likely to be found in the 
spot where the criminal is arrested.   
The question seemed settled in Chimel v. California, where the Court declared the exigent 
circumstances rationale to be the proper support for the search-incident-to-arrest exception.  The 
1981 decision in New York v. Belton, however, threw the SILA exception into a state of disarray.  
Belton was interpreted by many lower courts to allow an entitlement search by police officers 
every time a suspect was arrested in or near his automobile, allowing automobile searches well 
beyond the context described in Chimel. 
In Arizona v. Gant, the Court sought to eliminate the “entitlement” searches and restore the 
search-incident-to-arrest doctrine to its Chimel underpinnings.  The majority reaffirmed the 
exigency rationale and requirements that the automobile search be based on the need for officer 
protection or to prevent the destruction of evidence.  The majority also, however, adopted the 
rule proposed first by Justice Scalia in Thornton v. United States, which allowed searches when 
“it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”  
Allowing the long-defunct evidence-gathering rationale to creep back into the picture, the Court 
adopted that standard without analysis and without explanation of what the standard actually 
required, if anything at all.   
The Scalia rule has resulted in at least a three-way split among the lower courts searching for 
the correct interpretation.  Some courts have applied the “reasonable to believe” language to the 
type of offense- that is reasonable to believe the type of offense is one which might produce 
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physical evidence, which in turn may be found in the vehicle.  Other courts have equated the 
language “reasonable to believe” to the more venerable “reason to believe” standards from 
Payton v. New York and Terry v. Ohio, standards less than probable cause.  The Ninth Circuit, 
using its own Payton precedent, has equated the “reason to believe” standard to probable cause, 
reasoning that “probable cause” is a term of art connoting involvement of a magistrate.   
The nature-of-the-offense rule is the improper interpretation because of the potential for 
abuse and confusion.  If police were entitled to search every time the arrest was of the type 
which might yield physical evidence, then the Court’s purpose in Gant would be eviscerated. 
The nature-of-the-offense rule would be little more than a slightly-diluted version of Belton, 
allowing entitlement searches in all cases except for some minor traffic violations.  The nature-
of-the-offense rule would also cause confusion in the form of inconsistent results and indefinite 
line-drawing.  The nature-of-the-offense rule is both unworkable and constitutionally violative in 
light of Gant.   
The Ninth Circuit probable cause rule is similarly inappropriate.  If “reasonable to believe” 
were equivalent to probable cause, then the Scalia rule would be empty text, assimilated into the 
pre-existing automobile exception to the search warrant requirement.  Furthermore American 
jurisprudence is more than familiar with the probable cause standard and if the Court had 
intended to adopt probable cause as the standard, it would have done so.   
The proper interpretation is for “reasonable to believe” to encompass a standard requiring 
some proof that evidence may be found in a vehicle, but not proof amounting to probable cause.  
The Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard is the proper one because of its widespread 
application and wealth of interpretive law.  Courts in the past have equated language similar to 
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“reasonable to believe” to the Terry standard.  Applying Terry to Scalia’s evidentiary rule would 
both protect arrestee’s constitutional rights and would create predictable results. 
With a settled, uniform, and intuitive standard, the arrestee from the introductory paragraph 
would know her rights, as would the officer placing her under arrest.  The admissibility of the 
evidence would not turn on disconnected factors like the size or make of the vehicle, but instead 
on the probability of finding evidence as the Constitution commands.  And with all aspects of the 
automobile search-incident-to-arrest under the Fourth Amendment’s protection, the era of Belton 
and the entitlement search can finally be laid to rest. 
 
 
